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Abstract Organisms must often make predictions about
the trajectories of moving objects. However, often these
objects become hidden. To later locate such objects, the
organism must maintain a representation of the object in
memory and generate an expectation about where it will
later appear. We explored adult dogs’ knowledge and use of
the solidity principle (that one solid object cannot pass
through another solid object) by evaluating search behav-
ior. Subjects watched as a treat rolled down an inclined
tube into a box. The box either did or did not contain a solid
wall dividing it in half. To Wnd the treat, subjects had to
modify their search behavior based on the presence or
absence of the wall, which either did or did not block the
treat’s trajectory. Dogs correctly searched the near location
when the barrier was present and the far location when the
barrier was absent. They displayed this behavior from the
Wrst trial, as well as performed correctly when trial types
were intermingled. These results suggest that dogs direct
their searches in accordance with the solidity principle.
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Introduction
To survive in their environment, organisms must predict
moving objects’ trajectories, as well as decide which
objects to approach and which to avoid. Making the wrong
decision, such as approaching a snake, can often have
disastrous consequences. Often, moving objects become
hidden from view (e.g., disappear behind a tree). This dis-
appearance is problematic because the organism must
maintain a representation of the object in memory, as well
as generate an expectation about where it will later appear
(Hauser 2001). Humans and a variety of non-human ani-
mals (e.g., gorilla—Gorilla gorilla gorilla, Japanese
macaque—Macaca fuscata, African Grey parrot—Psitta-
cus erithacus, domesticated dogs—Canis familiaris) can
maintain representations of hidden objects over time (e.g.,
Piaget 1952; Natale et al. 1986; Doré and Dumas 1987;
Pepperburg and Funk 1990; Baillargeon and DeVos 1991;
Gagnon and Doré 1992; Fiset et al. 2003). However, the
factors underlying predictive reaching, searching, and look-
ing for objects that have become hidden from view are not
well understood, especially in organisms other than humans
and non-human primates.
We commonly assume that organisms use knowledge
gleaned from the visual world to direct their behavior
within their environment. This assumption is based in large
part on research using the expectancy violation paradigm
(i.e., “looking-time” method). Within this paradigm, indi-
viduals are thought to look longer at events inconsistent
with their expectations about the world than those that are
consistent. Research using this paradigm indicates that
human infants recognize that hidden items continue to exist
behind occluders, that objects move in continuous spatio-
temporal paths, and that one solid object cannot pass
through another (e.g., Baillargeon 1995; Leslie 1994;
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tancy violation paradigm, suggests that adult non-human
primates represent objects in much the same way as human
infants (e.g., Hauser et al. 1996; Uller et al. 2001; Santos
2004; Santos et al. 2005).
While some work suggests that human infants and some
adult non-human primates understand certain object princi-
ples when tested in expectancy violation tasks, prior work
has also indicated that they often appear unable to use these
same principles to successfully locate objects recently
hidden from view (e.g., Piaget 1954; Diamond 1991;
Munakata et al. 1997; Hauser 2001; Santos and Hauser
2002; Santos 2004). For example, while 4-month-old
human children looked longer at an object that appeared to
roll through a solid barrier (Spelke et al. 1992), 2-year-old
human children did not search in the correct location for an
object rolled in the direction of a barrier (e.g., Hood et al.
1999; Butler et al. 2002; Berthier et al. 2000). These studies
suggest that when toddlers search for objects, they fail to
use the principle of solidity (two solid objects cannot move
through one another), which is thought to be understood by
4 months of age (e.g., Spelke et al. 1992). Researchers have
observed comparable dissociations between expectancy
violation and search paradigms with some adult non-human
primates in tasks where subjects are required to reach for
objects that undergo interactions with other objects (e.g.,
Hauser 2001; Hauser et al. 2001; Santos and Hauser 2002;
Santos 2004; Santos et al. 2006). In contrast to these
results, Cacchione et al. (2009) recently observed that apes
successfully utilized solidity and proximity information in
conjunction to make correct choices about object move-
ment along horizontal trajectories. However, it is unclear
whether apes would have been successful using solidity
information alone.
Additional evidence further obfuscates the interpretation
of research examining organisms’ application of object
principles to successfully locate objects hidden from view.
For example, neither 2-year-old humans nor adult non-
human primates are plagued by the problems human infants
experience in search tasks. More speciWcally, by 2 years of
age, human children succeed at many means-ends tasks
(e.g., Brown 1990), classic tests of inhibition (e.g., Diamond
1991), and possess strong representations of hidden objects
(e.g., Munakata et al. 1997). Adult rhesus macaques
(Macaca mulatta), one of the species commonly employed
in such tasks, possess sophisticated motor capacities, show
the capacity to solve tasks involving inhibitory control and
working memory (e.g., Diamond 1990, 1993), and show
proWciency in tasks involving means-end action sequences
with tools (e.g., Hihara et al. 2003).
Many questions remain about why dissociations emerge
between search and expectancy violation tasks, as well as
what they mean. Various interpretations of why such
mismatches occur have been posited (e.g., Gómez 2005).
For example, one interpretation holds that such mismatches
emerge due to lack of executive ability (e.g., Gómez 2005).
This account suggests that as executive ability develops,
behavior should become more consistent across looking
and motor tasks (e.g., Diamond 1991). In human children,
such mismatches between knowing and acting can be
viewed within a developmental framework that incorpo-
rates maturation of the systems underlying executive con-
trol (e.g., Gómez 2005). However, this mismatch does not
appear to resolve in adult non-human primates in the same
manner that it does in humans. A second hypothesis holds
that the knowledge gleaned through looking-time methods
is not the same knowledge used for successful action in
motor search tasks (e.g., Munakata 2001; Bogartz et al.
2000; Gómez 2005). More speciWcally, Munakata (2001)
hypothesized that looking-time and manual search reXect
diVerent representations. Whereas looking-time data reXect
‘weak’ object representations, successful motor searches
require ‘stronger’ object representations (Munakata 2001).
Accordingly, it is possible that some species develop only
weak representations while others eventually develop
strong representations within the same domain, reXecting
diVerential success across looking-time and motor search
tasks. Finally, other theorists argue that the global interplay
among cognitive subsystems must be considered (e.g.,
Smith and Thelen 2003). Across species, cognitive abilities
such as object permanence or understanding of solidity
might develop in diVering cognitive contexts among
species.
Although questions linger regarding the nature and inter-
pretation of dissociations between search and expectancy
violation tasks, we have learned much in recent years
regarding how human infants and non-human primates rep-
resent objects. Studies have also begun to reveal how other
species represent objects (e.g., Pepperberg and Kozak
1986; Goulet et al. 1994; Funk 1996; Pepperberg et al.
1997; Pollock et al. 2000; Cooper et al. 2003; Fiset et al.
2003, 2006, 2007; Collier-Baker et al. 2004; Mendes and
Huber 2004; Fiset and Doré 2006; Zucca et al. 2007;
Miklósi 2007; Miller et al. 2009; Whitt et al. 2009; Deppe
et al. 2009). Indeed, such explorations could provide new
insights into tasks with human and non-human primate
populations. More speciWcally, investigations employing a
species not traditionally examined in this research such as
dogs might oVer information regarding interactions of
naïve knowledge of solidity and learned behavior, as well
as whether species-speciWc mechanisms exist.
Domesticated dogs likely utilize representations of
objects in their everyday life for such tasks as searching and
retrieving objects. Yet, we largely lack information to judge
how similar or diVerent their representations are from our
own. Researchers have begun to explore dogs’ knowledge123
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studies successfully excluding the role of olfactory cues
have demonstrated that dogs can succeed at invisible dis-
placement problems (e.g., Triana and Pasnak 1981; Gagnon
and Doré 1992, 1993; Watson et al. 2001; but see Collier-
Baker et al. 2004; Fiset and LeBlanc 2007). Additionally,
dogs do show an initial gravity bias, and yet they (unlike
human infants and monkeys) are able to learn to overcome
their gravity bias (Osthaus et al. 2003).
Here, we sought to assess dogs’ knowledge of solidity
by evaluating search behavior when an object rolled in the
direction of a barrier. We chose to study solidity because
past research indicates that human toddlers, adult rhesus
macaques, and adult cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedi-
pus) all fail to reason about the location of a hidden barrier
when reaching for an invisibly displaced object even
though they show sensitivity to solidity information in
expectancy violation paradigms (Spelke et al. 1992;




The study was performed in the mid-Atlantic region of the
US in 2009. The owners and their dogs were recruited
through personal contact with the laboratory staV or via
Xiers posted throughout the community. Participation in
tests was voluntary and limited to dogs over 1 year of age.
Dogs included in this study had not had any formal agility
or advanced obedience training. They were also reported by
their owner to be free from major health problems. Labora-
tory staV pointed out to the owners that there were no cor-
rect or incorrect behaviors and that during the tasks they
were not to help their dog in any way.
As described later, before exposure to the experimental
trials, dogs completed pretraining to ensure that they
could and would make choices freely from both sides of
the apparatus without owner direction. The ten dogs
(M = 4.5 years, SD = 2.6, four female and six males) that
successfully completed this pretraining were included in
the study. One dog was excluded due to failure to make
choices during pretraining, and one dog was excluded due
to a side bias (only choosing from one side of the appara-
tus) during pretraining. The breed composition of our
sample (as reported by the owners) included one pug, one
Australian shepherd, one Catahoula, one golden retriever,
and six dogs of mixed breeds. Our sample size of ten dogs
falls within the wide range of sample sizes often
employed by others exploring dogs’ cognitive abilities
(e.g., Topál et al. 2006; Osthaus et al. 2005; Fiset et al.
2003; Miklósi et al. 1998).
Apparatus
Figure 1 depicts the apparatus. It consisted of a clear plastic
tube (1 m in length, 3.5 cm in diameter), which extended
diagonally into a wooden box (50 cm £ 25 cm £ 10 cm).
We placed white adhesive tape along the rear exterior of the
tube to aid subjects in seeing the movement of a brown dog
treat (2 cm in diameter) down the length of the tube. The
front exterior of the tube remained clear. Thus, when the
dog looked through the clear front of the tube, they saw the
brown treat sliding against a white background.
The tube was positioned such that it rose 0.75 m oV the
ground at its highest extent and entered the wooden box at
12 cm oV the ground. The wooden box could be opened and
closed via a hinged front panel. The hinged panel contained
two doors (12 cm£ 12 cm) centered on either side of the
front panel to allow easy access to either half of the box.
The doors were covered with multiple layers of fabric to
prevent subjects from viewing the inside of the box.
Fig. 1 Line drawing of the 
apparatus used in the experi-
ment. The solid wall is shown in 
the inserted position123
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access the box’s interior with either their snout or paw.
The rear wall of the box consisted of a false back, which
allowed the experimenter to control the placement of treats.
The top of the box contained a slit, which allowed the
experimenter to slide a solid black barrier (38 cm £
25 cm £ 0.5 cm) into the box. We reasoned if subjects
understood that the solid barrier blocked the treat’s trajec-
tory, they should use the position of the barrier to ascertain
the fallen treat’s location behind one of the two doors when
making choices. The box was false-baited throughout test
trials to control for possible use of olfactory cues.
False-baiting was accomplished while the dog was
brieXy distracted. The owner was instructed prior to the
start of the experiment that upon request, they would need
to direct their dog’s attention away from the apparatus.
With small dogs, the owner often physically lifted and held
their dog such that it faced away from the apparatus. With
larger dogs, the owner covered the dogs’ eyes or held the
dog’s face such that they could not see the apparatus. Dur-
ing test trials, the experimenter ensured each compartment
contained one treat when the dog made a choice. The false-
baited treat was placed while the dog was distracted. This
procedure is described more fully below. The inside Xoor of
the box was also frequently rubbed with dog treats. Audi-
tory cues related to the treats’ falls were similar across trials
and muZed by the box.
Procedure
All procedures were approved by the institution’s Animal
Care and Use Committee. Testing occurred in a room
within the laboratory. The dog’s owner was present
throughout all testing sessions and remained behind their
dog, maintaining control over the subject’s leash.
First, dogs were allowed to become familiar with the
experimenters, the test apparatus, and their general sur-
roundings by exploring the general area unhindered while
their owner completed various forms regarding such
domains as the dog’s general health, disposition, and train-
ing. This familiarity period was of »10 min duration. Fol-
lowing this acclimation period, all dogs underwent
pretraining.
Pretraining trials
The goal of pretraining was to further accustom the dog to
the apparatus, as well as ensure that the dog would make
choices in the absence of owner direction. We permitted the
owner to make short general commands to stay, sit, and
release. During pretraining, the owner held the dog at a dis-
tance of approximately 1 m from the apparatus, centered in
front of the wooden box. During all pretraining trials, dogs
were only allowed to make one choice per trial. The experi-
menter was positioned behind the apparatus with the hinged
front panel initially open. She showed a treat to the dog,
and, as the dog watched, she placed the treat inside the box
in one of two locations (counterbalanced across subjects)
using the front opening: near (the half of the box closest to
where the tube entered) or far (the half of the box farthest
from where the tube entered). After placing the treat, the
experimenter instructed the owner to release the dog, so
that it could come forward to retrieve the treat. After
instructing the owner, the experimenter immediately looked
away from the box and refrained from making eye contact
with the dog or owner to avoid giving the subject any non-
verbal cues. This was repeated for the remaining side of the
box (near or far).
Next, the experimenter closed the box’s front panel. The
experimenter repeated the procedure above with the excep-
tion that she reached through the appropriate curtain on the
front panel to place each treat, and three trials were con-
ducted with each half of the box (counterbalanced across
subjects).
Dogs that failed to choose without owner direction or
that displayed a side bias during pretraining were excluded
from the remaining trials (n = 2). Dogs were considered to
have a side bias during pretraining if they only made
choices from one door throughout pretraining. Excluded
subjects were not included in the subsequent data analysis
and did not engage in any test trials. Dogs that successfully
completed pretraining moved on to the experimental phase.
Test trials
Two types of test trials were conducted: “No Wall” and
“Wall”. Trials were run in three blocks: “No Wall”, “Wall,”
and “Mixed”. Wall and No Wall blocks consisted of six tri-
als each. Only No Wall trials were conducted in the No
Wall block; similarly, only Wall trials were conducted in
the Wall block. During the Mixed block, three No Wall and
three Wall trials were conducted for a total of six trials; trial
order was counterbalanced across subjects and occurred in
a pseudorandom sequence. No more than two trials of the
same trial type could appear in succession in the Mixed
block. The block order of the No Wall and Wall trials was
counterbalanced across subjects; however, the Mixed block
always appeared last. Videotaped examples of Wall and No
Wall trials, as described later, can be found in the online
supplementary information.
In the No Wall trials, the solid barrier was not present to
separate the box’s halves. The experimenter Wrst demon-
strated that the box was empty by opening the front of the
box. She said “look” and the dog’s name while passing her
hand through the center of the open box. Dogs were
allowed to sniV the inside of the box. Then, she closed the123
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distracted, the experimenter secretly placed a treat on the
near side of the apparatus. Next, the experimenter gained
the dog’s attention by saying its name and “look” to direct
it to look at a second treat in her hand above the hole in the
tube. She then dropped the treat into the tube. The treat
landed and was contained within the far compartment.
Importantly, after the treat was dropped into the tube, the
experimenter did not interfere with the box prior to the dog
making a choice. Depending on the size and demeanor of
the dog, she stood (big or very excited dogs) or sat (small
or tentative dogs) behind the box such that she was cen-
tered between the two openings. She avoided both eye
contact with the dog and owner, as well as looking at the
box by either looking at her feet (if standing) or her lap (if
sitting).
The dog was then allowed to make a choice between the
doors on the front panel. If the dog chose correctly (i.e., the
far door), it was allowed to consume the treat. If the dog
chose incorrectly (i.e., the near door), the treat was
removed from the far door such that the dog could see it.
When incorrect choices were made, the dog was not
allowed to consume the treat from either the correct or
incorrect location.
At the beginning of the block of Wall trials, the exper-
imenter opened the box’s hinged front opening. She said
“look” and the dog’s name to gain the dog’s attention.
She tapped each side of the solid barrier and then placed
it within the wooden box. After placing the solid barrier
within the wooden box, she tapped it again. Dogs were
allowed to sniV the inside of the box and the solid barrier.
Then, she closed the box’s front door. For each trial
within this block, the experimenter surreptitiously pre-
loaded the box with a treat on the far side of the appara-
tus while the dog and owner were distracted. Next, the
experimenter gained the dog’s attention by saying its
name and saying “look” to direct it to look at a second
treat in her hand above the hole in the tube. She then
dropped the treat into the tube. The treat landed and was
contained within the near compartment and the dog was
allowed to make a choice in a similar manner to No Wall
trials. The dog was then allowed to make a choice
between the doors on the front panel. If the dog chose
correctly (i.e., the near door), it was allowed to eat the
treat. If the dog chose incorrectly (i.e., the far door), the
treat was removed from the near door such that the dog
could see it. However, in this case, the dog was not
allowed to consume the treat.
During the Mixed block, three Wall and three No Wall
trials were completed in the same manner as described pre-
viously. For Wall trials, the experimenter demonstrated that
the barrier was solid in the manner indicated earlier each
time it was inserted.
Data collection and analysis
A second experimenter recorded the Wrst door the dog
searched within each trial. Responses were counted as cor-
rect only when the dog touched the curtain in front of the
fallen treat with any part of its face or forepaws Wrst (i.e.,
the near door for Wall trials and the far door for No Wall
trials). Dogs were only permitted to make one choice per
trial. In the case of incorrect searches, the dog was not
allowed to search again. The treat was removed from the
correct door, shown to the dog, and the dog was taken back
to the starting position by its owner.
Choices were conWrmed via later videotape analysis by
two naïve coders. Agreement among coders was high
(Cohen’s  = 0.93 for all trials). We converted the number
of correct searches made by the dog into a percentage of
correct searches for each trial type within each block.
We utilized one-sample t-tests to determine whether dogs’
mean performance diVered from that expected by chance.
We compared dogs’ percentage of correct choices in each
trial type to a chance value of 50.0% because there were two
places in which the dogs could search. If dogs were searching
at chance, we would expect them to only choose the correct
side on 50.0% of trials. We also employed paired-samples
t-tests to determine whether performance diVered between
trial types. Finally, we used binomial tests to determine
whether dogs chose the correct location signiWcantly above
chance on the Wrst trial of each trial type. In all tests, results
were only considered signiWcant if alpha < 0.05.
Results
The data from each condition are depicted in Fig. 2. The
number of dogs committing diVerent numbers of search
errors for each of the three conditions is reported in
Fig. 2 Mean percent correct during each block of trials: No Wall,
Wall, and Mixed. Chance is 50.0%. Error bars represent SEM123
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if dogs searched in the correct half of the box for each of
the Wrst two blocks. During these blocks, dogs received a
block of six No Wall trials and a block of six Wall trials. In
the No Wall condition, dogs searched in the correct far
location on 77.0% (SEM = 5.69) of the trials. The one-sam-
ple t-test indicated dogs searched in the far location signiW-
cantly above chance in the No Wall trials, t9 = 4.39,
P = 0.02 (d = 1.38, power = 0.95). In the Wall condition,
dogs searched in the correct near location on 85.0%
(SEM = 4.96) of trials. We again compared dogs’ perfor-
mance to a chance value of 50.0% using a one-sample t-
test. The test indicated dogs searched in the near location
signiWcantly above chance during Wall trials, t9 = 6.71,
P < 0.001 (d = 2.12, power = 0.98).
Next, we compared performance between the blocks of
Wall and No Wall trials to determine if a diVerence in accu-
racy existed using a paired-samples t-test. The test indi-
cated no diVerence in accuracy between the two trial types,
t9 = 0.958, P = 0.63 (d = 0.30).
Although subjects only completed six No Wall and six
Wall trials within these Wrst two blocks, we were concerned
that perhaps dogs had learned the correct response (i.e.,
respond to the near locations for the Wall trials and the far
location for the No Wall trials) over the course of the
repeated trials they experienced. To test this explanation,
we evaluated subjects’ responses for the Wrst trial of each of
the No Wall and Wall conditions by employing a binomial
test. For the No Wall trials, all ten subjects selected the
appropriate side of the box (far) on the Wrst trial, P < 0.001.
For the Wall trials, nine of ten subjects selected the appro-
priate side of the box (near, respectively) on the Wrst trial,
P = 0.02. Given that dogs performed accurately from the
Wrst trial of each trial type, a learning explanation for dogs’
accurate performance over trials is unlikely.
Finally, we examined dogs’ performance during the
Mixed block of trials. In this section, subjects experienced
both No Wall and Wall trials intermixed in a pseudorandom
sequence. The mean percentage of correct choices in this
block was 83.3% (SEM = 3.51). We again compared dogs’
performance to a chance value of 50.0% using a one-sam-
ple t-test. The test indicated dogs searched in the correct
location (near or far, depending on the presence or absence
of the barrier) signiWcantly above chance, t9 = 9.49,
P < 0.001 (d = 2.99, power = 0.97). This suggests that dogs
were able to correctly modify their search behavior depend-
ing on the presence or absence of the barrier. We also com-
pared performance for the Wall and No Wall trials within
the Mixed block to determine if a diVerence in accuracy
existed using a paired-samples t-test. The test indicated no
diVerence in accuracy between the two trial types, t9 = 0.51,
P = 0.62 (d = 0.16). This suggests that subjects were
equally adept at determining the location of the treat both
with and without the solid barrier in place during the Mixed
block.
Overall, dogs correctly searched the near location when
the barrier was present in Wall trials and the far location
when the barrier was absent in No Wall trials. Dogs spon-
taneously searched in the correct location from the Wrst
trial of each trial type (Wall and No Wall), as well as per-
formed correctly when the trial types were intermingled
during the Mixed block. Collectively, the data suggest that
dogs search in accordance with the principle of solidity,
understanding that one solid object cannot pass through
another.
Control trials
Given the surprising nature of these Wndings, we examined
whether subtle cuing during the experimental trials or dur-
ing pretraining might underlie dogs’ performance. SpeciW-
cally, six dogs (M = 4.2 years, SD = 3.1, two female and
four males) participated in a control condition. The breed
composition of the dogs included in the control trials (as
reported by their owner) were three Australian shepherds,
one German short-haired pointer, and two dogs of mixed
breeds).
We conducted the pretraining and experimental (six
Wall trials, six No Wall trials, six Mixed trials) trials in the
same manner as described earlier with two exceptions: (1) a
treat was not dropped down the tube and (2) both the near
and far sides of the box were false-baited while the dog was
distracted. If dogs in the experimental trials were simply
making choices based on the gestures or subtle cues given
by the experimenter, the motion of the treat should not mat-
ter in dogs’ choices and we should observe similar results
to those reported when the treat was rolled down the tube.
Thus, in the control trials if dogs were detecting and acting
in accordance with subtle experimenter cuing, we hypothe-
sized that the dogs would consistently choose the near door
for Wall trials and the far door for No Wall trials. If, how-
ever, the motion of the treat mattered to dogs’ choices, we
Table 1 Number of dogs in each condition committing diVerent
numbers of search errors
Digits reXect the number of dogs in each of the diVerent conditions
(Wall, No Wall, and Mixed trials) committing diVerent numbers of
search errors (searching at the non-baited location)
Condition Number of errors
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
No Wall 2 4 2 2 0 0 0
Wall 3 5 2 0 0 0 0
Mixed 2 6 2 0 0 0 0123
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treat was not dropped through the tube.
On No Wall trials, dogs chose the far side of the box on
55% of trials. This was not signiWcantly diVerent from
chance using a one-sample t-test (t5 = 0.44, P = 0.68). On
Wall trials, dogs chose the near side of the box on 61% of
trials. This was also not signiWcantly diVerent from chance
using a one-sample t-test (t5 = 0.88, P = 0.42). During
Mixed trials, dogs chose correctly on 42% of trials. This
was also not signiWcantly diVerent from chance using a
one-sample t-test (t5 = ¡1.17, P = 0.29).
Together, the data suggest that dogs did not readily
choose correctly when the treat’s motion was removed in
Wall and No Wall trials. These results address the possibil-
ity that the experimenter was subtly cuing the dogs in
experimental trials.
Discussion
In conjunction, the data suggest that dogs understand and
can use the principle of solidity—that one solid object can-
not pass through another solid object—to determine the
location of a hidden treat. Importantly, they readily use
this information in search tasks from the Wrst trial. This
outcome diVers from past research with human toddlers,
adult rhesus macaques, and adult cotton-top tamarins
(Saguinus oedipus). These subjects all failed to reason
about the location of a hidden barrier when reaching for an
invisibly displaced object, but evidenced sensitivity to
solidity information in expectancy violation paradigms
(Spelke et al. 1992; Berthier et al. 2000; Hood et al. 1999;
Santos 2004; Santos et al. 2006). Our results, however, do
accord with the Wndings of Cacchione et al. (2009) indicat-
ing that apes act in accordance with solidity and proximity
information in conjunction in tasks requiring judgments
regarding object movement in horizontal trajectories.
Additionally, these results suggest that dogs in this para-
digm understood invisible displacement. That is, they suc-
cessfully located a treat that moved away from the bottom
of the tube after falling from it toward the far end of the
box. Although some studies suggest that dogs do not
understand invisible displacement problems (Collier-
Baker et al. 2004; Fiset and LeBlanc 2007), a number of
other studies suggest that they do understand these prob-
lems (e.g., Triana and Pasnak 1981; Gagnon and Doré
1992, 1993; Watson et al. 2001). Perhaps dogs understand
invisible displacement when it is achieved via gravity or
self-propelled motion but not if it is brought about through
the manipulations of human actors in a more artiWcial
manner.
Why do dogs appear to utilize solidity information in
search tasks while young humans and adult non-human
primates do not do so consistently? The mechanism under-
lying dogs’ success in this task is unclear, although prior
work may yield insights to guide future research. First, per-
haps dogs come into the world with an innate understand-
ing of objects and how they interact, reminiscent of Spelke
et al.’s (1992) core knowledge proposal for human infants.
To date, few developmental studies with canines have eval-
uated what knowledge dogs do and do not have about
objects. Second, it is also possible that dogs learned over
their lifetime how objects interact, including the principle
of solidity. While the current data do not appear attribut-
able to learning within the trials of this task, it is possible
that the experiences dogs brought with them to the experi-
mental situation through interactions with objects gained
over their lifetime gave rise to accurate performance.
Third, perhaps humans inXuence dogs’ ability to use solid-
ity information. That is, humans utilize solidity information
in their everyday interactions with objects. A variety of
studies have indicated that dogs are proWcient readers of
human attention and gestures (e.g., Miklósi et al. 1998;
Hare et al. 1998; Agnetta et al. 2000; Soproni et al. 2001,
2002; Cooper et al. 2003). All of the subjects employed in
our study lived with humans. Perhaps these dogs learned to
pay attention to solidity information through attending to
their owners’ interactions with objects over time. That is,
perhaps their owner’s gestures cued dogs to the importance
of solidity in interactions with objects. Fourth, it is also
possible that domestication played a role in the emergence
of dogs’ abilities to understand and use solidity informa-
tion. That is, during domestication and breed selection,
some individuals may have been selected·whether
implicitly or explicitly·for their ability to understand how
objects interact (Coppinger and Coppinger 2001). Such
skills would no doubt be valuable to breeds assisting
humans in hunting and service (e.g., cattle cannot be
herded through a solid fence). Dissociating such explana-
tions may be accomplished through future experiments that
compare domesticated dogs and undomesticated wolves
(Canis lupis), dogs with diVerent levels of socialization to
humans, as well as the performance of adult and juvenile
animals.
The experiment presented here clearly does not com-
pletely resolve or explain the discrepancies often seen
between the Wndings of studies examining performance in
infant looking and reaching tasks. However, our Wndings
contribute to a more inclusive investigation of physical
knowledge across primate and non-primate species. Com-
parison across species, tasks, and development will likely
provide a more complete understanding of the principles
governing search behavior, looking, and underlying object
representations. As such, future research may be better
positioned to render evidence addressing these critical
issues within the cognitive development Weld.123
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